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CIVIL RIGHTS—FROM NEGATIVE RESTRICTION TO 
AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION: A CALL FOR MASSACHUSETTS TO 
RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO REHABILITATION BEGINNING WITH 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Jennifer L. Weekley * 
 
In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, 1 
N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court sparked significant juvenile sentencing reform in the 
state.  Previously an outlier for its harsh treatment of juveniles, 
the Commonwealth now prohibits the imposition of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders.  This crucial step forward in juvenile justice is dually 
rooted in neuroscience advancements and society’s ever-
evolving standards of decency.  The premise is simply that 
children are different.  Children are categorically impulsive, 
more susceptible to negative environmental influences, and 
their malleable character is less persuasive evidence of 
irretrievable depravity that would otherwise justify a sentence 
to die behind bars.  Based on these accepted differences, the 
court holds that juvenile offenders, being the most apt for 
change, should thus be afforded a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate rehabilitation.  Unfortunately, this significant step 
towards reform rings hollow given the current state of the 
Commonwealth’s correctional system and its want for 
consistent rehabilitative services. 
 
This Note examines: a history of case law and scientific 
developments leading up to the reform; competing theories of 
punishment and rehabilitation; social science regarding the 
outcomes of previously incarcerated juveniles; and the state of 
incarceration, rehabilitation, and paroling in Massachusetts.  
Ultimately, this Note argues that there are a multitude of legal 
sources from which the Commonwealth should find a 
* B.A., English, University of Connecticut, 2008; J.D. Candidate, 
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freestanding, actionable right to rehabilitation for those 
arrested as juveniles and incarcerated into adulthood, thus 
making Diatchenko more than mere aspiration. 
 
“No correctional approach is a panacea, but neither are all 
approaches equal.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fourteen-year-old Philip Chism of Danvers, Massachusetts, 
has been charged, as an adult, and convicted of the robbery, sexual 
assault, and murder of his twenty-four-year-old high school math 
teacher, Colleen Ritzer.2  Ms. Ritzer’s body was found in a 
recycling bin behind the school accompanied by a simple but 
cryptic note scratched on notebook paper that read, “I hate you 
all.”3  Philip’s mother later told police that the worst thing her son 
had ever gotten into trouble for was throwing paper on a school 
bus.4 
It is an indisputably terrifying idea that someone as young as 
Philip and without a history of disciplinary issues or aggressive 
behavior could be capable of such atrocious acts.  How tragically 
simple it would be to write off Philip as a biological anomaly—a 
superpredator5 in the making—and to throw away the key.  Such 
unilateral severity has been the practice in Massachusetts, an 
unexpected outlier in its harsh treatment of juveniles.6  However, 
1.  Francis T. Cullen, Make Rehabilitation Corrections’ Guiding Paradigm, 
6(4) CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 717, 722 (2007). 
2.  Police: Student Admitted Killing Danvers Teacher, CBS BOSTON (Jan. 
27, 2014), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2014/01/27/student-admitted-killing-danvers-
teacher/ [https://perma.cc/XR8C-87LT]. 
3.  Id. 
4.  O’Ryan Johnson, DA: Teen didn’t raise any flags before slaying, BOS. 
HERALD (Aug. 13, 2014) at 16, http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_ 
coverage/2014/08/da_teen_didn_t_raise_any_flags_before_slaying.  Notably, after 
his arrest, Philip was housed at the Worcester Recovery Center and Hospital.  Id. 
5.  The early 1990’s science that predicted an influx of “superpredators,” 
impulsive, brutal, remorseless children, has since been renounced by the scientific 
community including John DiIulio, the Princeton professor who coined the term.  
The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 
2014), http://www.eji.org/node/893 [https://perma.cc/AL9S-GKFK].  However, 
DiIulio’s prediction of hundreds of thousands of psychopathic children set off a 
public panic that resulted in nearly every state passing more stringent legislation 
regarding the treatment of juveniles as adults in criminal sentencing.  Id.  And 
while juvenile crime rates had in fact started to fall at the same time of this 
prediction, public fear of innately dangerous youths lingers on.  Id. 
6.  LIA MONAHON & BARBARA KABAN, CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, UNTIL THEY DIE A NATURAL DEATH: YOUTH SENTENCED 
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recent judicial7 and legislative8 developments, as well as public 
consensus,9 suggest a sea change could be on the horizon for the 
Bay State. 
The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), the highest court in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, prides itself for frequently 
extending state constitutional protections above and beyond those 
afforded by the United States Constitution.10  Most recently, in the 
case of Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, the 
SJC further enhanced11 the juvenile sentencing standard set forth 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama.12  
In Miller, the imposition of mandatory life sentences without the 
possibility of parole unto juvenile offenders was found to be 
unconstitutional, in violation of the United States Constitution’s 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.13  The Court rooted this decision in newly accepted 
scientific and sociological research on adolescent development that 
TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MASSACHUSETTS 6 (2009), 
http://www.clcm.org/untiltheydie.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LQC-PKL9]; Sarah 
Thomas, Chism Motion to Dismiss Denied, Will be Tried as an Adult, 
WICKEDLOCAL (Aug. 13, 2014), http://danvers.wickedlocal.com/article/20140813 
/News/140818825 [https://perma.cc/ACB2-45VK] (“[Massachusetts is] the only 
state that gives no discretion, even to prosecutors, over whether to try a juvenile as 
an adult in the case of first degree murder.”). 
7.  Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013). 
8.  H.B. 1432, 2013–2014 Leg., 188th Sess. (Mass. 2013) (enacted). 
9.  Ready for Reform? Public Opinion on Criminal Justice in Massachusetts, 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH POLLING GROUP 
(Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.massincpolling.com/?p=1334 [https://perma.cc/27Q3-
3NLE] (a poll of 1,207 Massachusetts residents revealed that nearly two thirds of 
residents think the criminal justice system should prioritize rehabilitation or 
prevention over punishment or enforcement). 
10.  See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000) 
(holding that defendant’s right under art. XII of Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights to be informed of attorney’s efforts to render assistance are broader than 
rights under Fifth and Sixth Amendments to United States Constitution); 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 109–10 (Mass. 1999) (affirming that 
privacy rights afforded drivers and occupants of motor vehicles during routine 
traffic stops are broader under art. XIV of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
than under Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution); Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Mass. 1997) (affirming that confrontation rights 
under art. XII of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights are greater than those under 
Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution); District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1272, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (concluding that death penalty 
contravened prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment in art. XXVI, 
notwithstanding constitutionality under Eighth Amendment). 
11.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 270.  
12.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
13.  Id. at 2475.  
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has slowly but surely weaved its way into legal precedent.14  The 
very salient thread that runs through the decision in Miller is that 
adolescents are different than adults and should be treated thusly 
by the courts.15 
The court in Diatchenko went one step further to prohibit 
even discretionary life without the possibility of parole sentencing 
of juveniles.16  In doing so, the SJC whole-heartedly embraced the 
idea that juvenile, or youthful, offenders are different—in the midst 
of formation in all ways—and thus categorically cannot ever be 
deemed deserving of the state’s most severe punishment no matter 
how egregious the offense.17  This understanding affirms the 
youthful offender as a symbol of hope for the possibility of reform.  
The court thus implies that Philip, and others like him, should be 
afforded not only the possibility of parole, but a chance at 
rehabilitation.18  However, such a hope—as well as the court’s 
holding in Diatchenko—rings hollow given the current state of the 
Massachusetts correctional system and the lack of consistency 
when it comes to rehabilitation services offered to our incarcerated 
population.19  The qualities acknowledged by the court in their 
decision to prohibit life without the possibility of parole sentences 
for juveniles20 give rise to a parallel set of reasons why reform is 
14.  Brief of the American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 6–7, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-
9646, 10-9647); Brief of the American Medical Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
In Support of Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633); See generally Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services, Publication No. 11-4929, The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction 
(2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-still-under-
construction/teen-brain_141903.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS5R-L3PS].  
15.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458. 
16.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 284–85.  Massachusetts is now one of fourteen 
states that ban life without the possibility of parole sentencing for juveniles.  States 
that Ban Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR 
SENTENCE OF YOUTH (Aug. 25, 2015), http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/2015/08/25/ 
states-that-ban-life-without-parole-lwop-sentences-for-children/.  Five additional 
states ban such sentencing in “most cases.”  Id. 
17.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 276–77.  
18.  AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS 
IN ADULT AND JUVENILE COURTS 11 (2006).  Parens patriae is a theory where the 
state assumes the role of a surrogate parent, becoming responsible for fostering the 
proper growth and development of the juveniles in its care.  See infra Part I.C. 
19.  MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH, CRIME, 
COST, AND CONSEQUENCES: IS IT TIME TO GET SMART ON CRIME? 16 (2013), 
http://massinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Crime_Cost_Consequences_ 
MassINC_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGK4-QR3X] [hereinafter “MASSINC”]. 
20.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 277.  Youthful qualities considered by the court 
include: lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to 
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overwhelmingly unlikely for youths facing adult charges and 
sentences, like Philip.  In Massachusetts, juvenile offenders facing 
adult charges are caught between systems and between priorities.  
Without affirmative steps to guarantee meaningful access to 
rehabilitative services in adult facilities, the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders only represents the release of a likely 
uneducated, unskilled, inexperienced individual, who was deprived 
of the privilege of childhood and the development of dignity, being 
dumped back into the community where he is more than ever likely 
to recidivate.21   
This Note will discuss the current practices of various 
Massachusetts correctional facilities, their successes and failures at 
reform, and will argue that without recognizing a free-standing 
right to rehabilitation, any permanent reform will ultimately fail 
because it is subject to budgetary whims and shifting state 
priorities.  As it has done before, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts must enhance protections for those within its 
borders and recognize an actionable right to rehabilitation for 
those whom it incarcerates, beginning with those most apt for 
change—juvenile offenders. 
This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the background 
necessary to consider this issue: case law, scientific research, 
theories of rehabilitation, and a history of the juvenile courts and 
rehabilitation in Massachusetts.  Part II addresses Massachusetts’s 
failures and successes in providing rehabilitative services to those 
whom it incarcerates in search of an amalgamation to function as 
an attainable model for rehabilitation services.  Part III analyzes 
the outcomes of juveniles that have entered the criminal justice 
system in order to emphasize the particular struggles faced with 
reentry generally.  Lastly, Part IV argues—based on an abundance 
of state law, international norms, and purposivist sources—that 
rehabilitation must be recognized as a free-standing right in the 
Commonwealth.  This Note concludes with a call to action for 
Massachusetts’s courts, legislators, and constituents to hold the 
Commonwealth legally responsible for providing dignity-centric 
outside pressures, and lack of fixed sense of self or character.  Id.  
21.  Elizabeth Gudrais, The Prison Problem, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2013), 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/the-prison-problem; Anna Aizer and Joseph 
Doyle, What is the Long-Term Impact of Incarcerating Juveniles?, VOX (July 16, 
2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-long-term-impact-incarcerating-juveniles; 
Maia Szalavitz & Joseph Doyle, Why Juvenile Detention Makes Teens Worse, 
TIME (Aug. 7, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1914837, 
00.html. 
226 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:221
rehabilitative services. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. “Children Are Constitutionally Different:” 22 Case Law 
Leading Up to Diatchenko and Miller 
More than thirty years after the affirmation of his first degree 
murder conviction on direct appeal,23 Gregory Diatchenko, who 
was seventeen-years-old at the time of his arrest and sentenced to 
life without the possibility of parole, suddenly became eligible for 
release24 after the decision in Miller.25  At the age of seventeen, 
Gregory violently stabbed a stranger over twenty times while 
committing a robbery.26  No mitigating factors, including youth, 
were considered at the sentencing phase of the trial because the 
judge was required to impose the statutory punishment—life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.27 
Shortly after his conviction, Gregory brought a claim that 
asserted his sentence was in violation of both the federal28 and 
state29 prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment for its 
severity, specifically its length in relation to his age at the time of 
sentencing.30  The SJC rejected this claim, but the substantive law 
established in Miller enabled the court to accept Gregory’s nearly 
identical argument in 2013.  The holdings in Miller and Diatchenko 
hinge on the principle of proportionality, a concept that seeks to 
find balance between the nature of the crime, any mitigating 
characteristics of the defendant—such as youth—and the severity 
of the sentence to be imposed.31  Given the robust precedent 
established since 1982 that contemplated such proportionality of 
harsh juvenile sentencing,32 the SJC held, in accordance with Miller, 
22.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
23.  Commonwealth. v. Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Mass. 1982). 
24.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 286–87. 
25.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474. 
26.  Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d at 399.  
27.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2 (2012). 
28.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
29.  MASS. CONST. art. XXVI.  
30.  Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d at 400.  
31.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass. 2013). 
32.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole on juvenile offenders 
who did not commit homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death 
sentence for juvenile offenders; a child’s action are less likely to be “evidence of 
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that Gregory’s sentence was in fact cruel and unusual and that such 
severity in juvenile sentencing would no longer be the practice in 
Massachusetts.33 
Since the December 2013 decision, Gregory received a parole 
hearing and is soon to be paroled after serving over thirty-three 
years in prison.34  The seven page parole board decision largely 
hinged on Gregory demonstrating that he had rehabilitated 
himself,35 despite the fact that until that point Gregory did not have 
the possibility of ever being released.  Gregory has spent pivotal 
developmental years of his life behind bars, in adult facilities, and 
because he was a juvenile facing adult charges, he was never 
afforded the benefit of rehabilitative services normally afford to 
those adjudicated in juvenile courts.  For this reason, the parole 
board imposed a special condition that Gregory be paroled after 
another twelve months in a lower security facility with weekly 
Alcohol Anonymous meetings and counseling sessions for 
adjustment and anxiety.36  Because he was not provided resources 
for rehabilitation during his sentence, Gregory is being detained for 
an additional year to receive such support.  Courts have 
acknowledged that, “[t]ime at [prison] costs a man more than part 
of his life; it robs him of his skills, his ability to cope with society in 
a civilized manner, and, most importantly, his essential human 
dignity.”37  Having been detained by the state since he was 
seventeen-years-old and given the degradation that accompanies 
irretrievably depraved character”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty 
for “mentally retarded” offenders); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty 
absent consideration of mitigating evidence such as character and circumstances). 
33.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 284–85. 
34.  In re Gregory Diatchenko, W38579, (Mass. Parole Bd. Oct. 31, 2014). 
35.  Massachusetts Guidelines for Life Sentence Decisions, MASS. PAROLE 
BOARD (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-board/ 
guidelines-for-life-sentence-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/MD4X-922R].  These 
guidelines include eight direct references to the requisite of rehabilitation and 
reformation is the primary focus of two of the three main questions considered by 
the paroling board: 
I. Has the inmate’s period of incarceration been of sufficient length to 
adequately protect the public, punish him for his conduct, deter others, and 
allow for rehabilitation?  II. Is the inmate rehabilitated?  III. Are there 
reasons to conclude that the inmate will live outside prison as a sober, law-
abiding, employed, productive person who is making positive contributions 
to his family and his community?  
Id. 
36.  In re Gregory Diatchenko, W38579, (Mass. Parole Bd. Oct. 31, 2014). 
37.  Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 325 (D.N.H. 1977). 
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long-term incarceration, what Gregory has to prove in one year 
with some counseling raises the bar on an already improbably high 
standard. 
B.  The “Science, Social Science and Common Sense”38 behind 
Adolescent Decision Making 
The area of the brain involved in impulse control, the 
prefrontal cortex, is incompletely developed in adolescents.39  In 
fact, the most recent science suggests that this part of the brain is 
not fully formed until the mid-twenties.40  The prefrontal cortex is 
responsible for a process known as executive functioning, which 
occurs subconsciously in most adults and is responsible for 
decision-making, long-term planning, and the ability to assess risks 
and consequences.41  Impulsive behavior nearly exclusively 
attributed to adolescents, or the often pejorative “teenagers,” is 
rooted in this cognitive science; the oldest, most primitive part of 
the brain takes the lead before the prefrontal cortex is fully 
functional.42  The adolescent, or twenty-something, brain has come 
to be understood as primarily instinctual, operating on automatic 
“flight or fight” responses.43 
Drawing from this neuroscience, and a long list of Supreme 
Court precedent that gradually integrated it into case law,44 the SJC 
wrote that “science, social science, and common sense” tell us that 
children, even children who committed egregious crimes, are not as 
culpable as their adult counterparts.45  More specifically, children 
are different in three primary ways.  First, “[c]hildren demonstrate 
‘a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ 
leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”46  
38.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 277.  
39.  Brief for the American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 6–7, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-
9646, 10-9647); Brief of the American Medical Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
In Support of Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633); see generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., Publication No. 11-4929, The Teen Brain: Still Under 
Construction (2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-
still-under-construction/teen-brain_141903.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS5R-L3PS]. 
40.  MONAHON & KABAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 
(Mass. 2013). 
45.  Id. at 277. 
46. Id. at 277 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) and 
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Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences 
and outside pressures.”47  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, “a 
child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are 
‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] 
deprav[ity].’”48  The court further opines that given the unique 
characteristics universal to juvenile offenders as a class, these 
offenders show the greatest possibility of reform and should 
subsequently “be afforded a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”49  
This inclusion, and in fact the court’s entire rationale, can be read 
as requiring rehabilitative services for juveniles.  The recognition of 
these differences is not entirely ground-breaking when considering 
that the juvenile courts in this Commonwealth were created 
expressly for the purpose of treating youthful offenders 
differently—to treat them “not as criminals, but as children in need 
of aid, encouragement and guidance.”50 
C.  Juvenile Courts and the Department of Youth Services in 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts has historically been a pioneer and leader in 
juvenile justice.  In addition to creating the nation’s first juvenile 
correctional system in 1846,51 much of the research on adolescent 
development has come out of programs at the University of 
Massachusetts.52  Massachusetts “has statewide juvenile courts, 
well-trained judges, excellent juvenile court clinics, a juvenile 
defense bar, and one of the best Department of Youth Services 
(“DYS”) in the country.”53 
quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
47. Id. at 276–77 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 and quoting Roper, 543 
U.S. at 570). 
48.  Id. at 277 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 and quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 
570). 
49.  Id. at 286–87 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). 
50.  MONAHON & KABAN, supra note 6, at 13 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 119, § 53 (2016)). 
51. First in the Nation, DEP’T OF YOUTH SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/ 
eohhs/gov/departments/dys/programs-and-services/history/first-in-the-nation.html 
[https://perma.cc/R9D5-BJHW] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
52. See generally Systems and Psychosocial Advances Research Center, 
DEP’T OF PSYCHIATRY UNIV. OF MASS. MED. SCH., http://www.umassmed.edu/ 
sparc/ [https://perma.cc/6CBW-EA8Q](last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
53.  Jean Trounstine, Why Sentencing Children as Adults is a Bad Idea, BOS. 
MAG.: BOS. DAILY (Nov. 1, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/ 
news/blog/2013/11/01/philip-chism-juvenile-adult-court/ [https://perma.cc/3EUW-
MHWX].  
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However, there remains a multifarious gap for juveniles facing 
adult charges.  The 1996 enactment of the Commonwealth’s 
Youthful Offender statute provides that all juveniles aged fourteen 
and older charged with murder be automatically treated as adults.54  
There exists no mechanism for anyone, not even prosecutors, to 
have such a case removed to juvenile court.  A juvenile delinquent, 
defined as a youth between the ages of seven and seventeen who 
has committed a felony or misdemeanor, “may be given an 
‘indeterminate’ sentence which commits them to DYS custody until 
age 18.”55  A youthful offender, defined as a youth between the 
ages of fourteen and seventeen, who has committed a felony and 
either has previous DYS commitment, a firearms offense, or an 
offense involving the infliction or threat or serious bodily harm, 
“can receive a commitment to DYS until age 21, a combination 
DYS commitment and adult sentence, or an adult sentence at a 
judge’s discretion.”56  Those juveniles tried for murder are left in a 
no-man’s-land of pre-trial detainment without the guarantee of 
DYS services and similarly without hope for consistent 
rehabilitative services after sentencing. 
Why this gap exists can be traced back to a time of pivotal 
change for the Massachusetts DYS and other correctional facilities 
all over the country.  During the 1990s, DYS experienced a 
simultaneous “growth in the numbers of juveniles committed to its 
custody” and a decrease in its budget.57  As a result of decreased 
funding, previously lauded juvenile training programs were lost.58 
A change in administration in the mid-1990s led to the 
creation of the Hogan Commission (“Commission”) to evaluate the 
state of DYS.59  The Commission concluded that DYS priorities 
must shift away from training and rehabilitation to public safety 
and crime prevention given the “more violent juvenile 
54.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 72(B) (2016).  
55. Juvenile Justice and Rehabilitation in Massachusetts, MASS.GOV, 
http://170.63.70.137/portal/articles/juvenile-justice-and-rehabilitation-in-
massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/A9LK-MXH9] (last updated Feb. 5, 2016).  
56.  Id. 
57.  The Growth of Community Partnerships and a Continuum Care, DEP’T 
OF YOUTH SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dys/programs-
and-services/history/growth-of-community-partnership-and-a-continuum-care.html 
[https://perma.cc/AC2P-BBWU] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).  
58.  Id. 
59.  Hogan Commission, DEP’T OF YOUTH SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/ 
eohhs/gov/departments/dys/programs-and-services/history/hogan-commission.html 
[https://perma.cc/87ZN-ZDBM] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).  
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population.”60  The Commission issued a report of 
recommendations including, inter alia, the need to physically 
separate juveniles facing adult sentences from other juveniles in its 
facilities.61  Shortly thereafter, DYS opened its first wing in an adult 
correctional facility to house juveniles facing adult sentences for 
crimes such as murder.62 
Again based on the increase in violent offenses, DYS applied 
for and received a U.S. Department of Justice grant to establish the 
Serious and Violent Offender Re-entry program.63  DYS was 
awarded funds to design a model reentry program for a “targeted 
group of serious and violent juvenile offenders.”64  Today, over a 
decade after its inception, this reentry program takes only fifteen to 
twenty applicants per month, age eighteen to thirty-two, who are 
expected to be released into one of three specific Boston 
neighborhoods, and have been determined high-risk for 
recidivism,65 as opposed to those determined to have a high 
probability of reform. 
  
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63. Community Re-entry, DEP’T OF YOUTH SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/ 
eohhs/gov/departments/dys/programs-and-services/history/community-re-
entry.html [https://perma.cc/F639-ZTPM] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
64.  Id. 
65. Boston (Massachusetts) Reentry Initiative, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=42 (last visited Feb. 29, 
2016).  
232 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:221
D.  Competing Theories of Rehabilitation: Why the Right Lens 
Matters 
“I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in 
his quality as a man, even though by his deeds he makes 
himself unworthy of it.”66 
At its base, the concept of rehabilitation rests on the 
assumption that criminal behavior is caused by some factor that has 
the potential to be remedied or at least substantially mitigated.67 
While individuals are capable of making free-willed or conscious 
criminal choices, rehabilitation is premised on the notion that even 
these choices are heavily influenced by a person’s social 
surroundings, psychological development, and/or biological 
makeup.68  Youth is the perfect storm69 of social, psychological, and 
biological predisposition for criminality alongside which there runs 
a parallel potentiality for rehabilitation.70  Criminogenic risk 
factors, such as age at the time of first offense, poor school 
performance, association with an anti-social peer group, substance 
abuse, and subpar parenting practices, have been recognized as 
rehabilitatable factors.71 
In the way that parents, caretakers, and teachers aim to guide 
youthful minds and behavior, so must the Commonwealth in the 
case of a childhood interrupted by incarceration.  This notion is 
referred to as parens patriae, a legal theory where the state 
assumes the role of surrogate parent, becoming responsible for 
fostering proper growth and development of those juveniles under 
its care.72  Without affirmative efforts to neutralize the negative 
effects of incarceration, the Commonwealth’s punitive 
intervention, and the anti-social trappings that come along with it, 
can easily become an added criminogenic risk factor—an 
66.  IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 255 (Mary Gregor 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). 
67.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (2d ed. 2002). 
68.  Id. 
69.  “Perfect storm,” is defined as “a critical or disastrous situation created by 
a powerful concurrence of factors.”  Perfect storm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/perfect%20storm 
[https://perma.cc/86LK-F4WV] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
70.  Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 277 (Mass. 
2013). 
71.  Cailin O’Connor, What Research Tells Us about Effective Interventions 
for Juvenile Offenders, UNIV. OF WIS.–MADISON/EXTENSION (Jan. 2008), 
http://fyi.uwex.edu/whatworkswisconsin/files/2014/04/factsheet_1juvenile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQ6C-UUTA]. 
72.  KUPCHIK, supra note 18.  
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experience in a young person’s life that increases the chances of 
future behavior problems.  Why, and thus, how, the 
Commonwealth should intervene leads to the consideration of 
different models of rehabilitation. 
For the purposes of this Note, two different, and inherently 
opposing, theories of rehabilitation will be addressed, either of 
which could be successfully used to analyze inmate rehabilitation in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  The first theory or model 
has been described as utilitarian or authoritarian.73  This model 
emphasizes the need for reform so that society may benefit from a 
reduction in crime and an increase in productive citizenry.74  The 
second model is humanistic or rights-based and is rooted in the 
recognition of an individual’s inherent dignity as a human being,75 a 
proposition that may very well also lead to the utilitarian goal of 
civic responsibility.76 
Utilitarianism may be best understood by an axiom created by 
its founder, “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong.”77  To maximize the total benefit 
and reduce the total suffering is to place the desires of the majority 
ahead of the needs of the individual.78  Pure utilitarianism would 
readily sacrifice the individual to preserve or restore happiness to 
the majority.79  While the intent of utility sounds moral—a system 
that seeks to ensure the majority of its members are happy—its 
application today registers as predominately economic.80  Thus, the 
73. Edgardo Rotman, Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right 
to Rehabilitation, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1023, 1026 (1987).  
74.  Id.  “In this view correctional treatment is essentially a technical device 
to mold the personality of offenders and obtain their compliance with a 
predesigned pattern of thought and behavior.  Such ‘rehabilitation’ is easily 
downgraded to a mere instrument of institutional discipline . . . .” Id. 
75.  Id. 
76. “[H]umanistic rehabilitation offers inmates a sound and trustworthy 
opportunity to remake their lives.  Thus, this model seeks to awaken in inmates a 
deep awareness of their relationships with the rest of society, resulting in a genuine 
sense of social responsibility.”  Id. 
77. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT xiv (Ross 
Harrison ed. 1988). 
78.  Id. 
79.  H.J. McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. 
REV. 466, 468–69 (1957).  McCloskey offered the classic criticism of utilitarian 
theory via a hypothetical in which a sheriff is faced with the choice of either 
framing a black man for a rape to prevent race-based rioting or conducting an 
investigation for the actual assailant and effectively allowing the rioting to occur.  
Pure utilitarianism would require the sheriff to frame the man regardless of guilt.  
Id. 
80.  Infra, Part II.C.  See also Samuel Lewis, Rehabilitation: Headline or 
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consequence or outcome of any action is analyzed for not only the 
majority’s happiness, but also for the majority’s economic benefit.  
The individual is lost. 
Rights-based theory is founded on the notion that an 
individual has moral rights that one is said to enjoy or have 
naturally and that legal rights should flow from those natural 
rights.81  In other words, a rights-based approach can be framed in 
this way: 
First, it means clearly understanding the difference between a 
right and a need.  A right is something to which I am entitled 
solely by virtue of being a person.  It is that which enables me to 
live with dignity. Moreover, a right can be enforced before the 
government and entails an obligation on the part of the 
government to honor it.  A need, on the other hand, is an 
aspiration which can be quite legitimate, but is not necessarily 
associated with an obligation on the part of the government to 
cater to it; satisfaction of a need cannot be enforced.  Rights are 
associated with “being,” whereas needs are associated with 
“having.”82 
A right for one to do X necessarily implies a reciprocal duty 
unto others, including the state, to not interfere with one’s 
performance of X. 
When an incarcerated person is seen as the holder of rights, 
meaningful individual rehabilitation, as opposed to the benefit of 
rehabilitation derived by the society at large, becomes not only a 
possibility, but a priority.83  When an incarcerated person is viewed 
as a passive recipient of available rehabilitative services offered 
after a cost-benefit analysis, then that person becomes a means to 
an end,84 and their inherent human dignity is disregarded.  A rights-
based approach “requires a penal policy that maintains scrupulous 
respect for the dignity of prisoners and provides for the genuine 
fulfillment of their basic human needs, which go beyond mere 
physical survival.”85  The longevity and reliability of a recognized 
right to rehabilitative services, versus mere participation in a 
program, is indisputable; “[w]here rehabilitation is conceived as a 
Footnote in the New Penal Policy?, 52(2) PROBATION JOURNAL 123 (2007). 
81.  Ligia Bolívar, The Fundamentalism of Dignity, in A HUMAN RIGHTS 
MESSAGE 27, 28 (Swedish Institute ed. 1998). 
82.  Id. at 29–30. 
83.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1026–27. 
84.  KANT, supra note 66, at 57.  “Punishment . . . can never be inflicted 
merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil 
society.”  Id. at 140. 
85.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1027. 
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right, effectiveness becomes a secondary consideration and no 
longer encroaches upon other priorities related to the needs of 
individual offenders and to the requirements of their actual 
sociopsychological improvement.”86  Under this model, 
governments or wardens could not simply withdraw services 
because of statistically insignificant outcomes or a desire to 
reallocate funding; available services are not determined by 
utilitarian value, but by explicit legal conditions.87 
While either model may be used as a rationale to provide 
rehabilitative programs or services for incarcerated citizens of 
Massachusetts, this Note argues that the latter model is the 
preferable framework through which long-lasting improvements to 
the criminal justice system can be made because a dignity-centered 
approach requires recognizing a free-standing, actionable right to 
rehabilitation. 
Further, this Note advocates for a system of state-obligated 
rehabilitation under which the Commonwealth has a duty to offer 
meaningful rehabilitative services.88  State-obligated rehabilitation 
is a form of social contract theory, “the moral legitimacy of the 
State’s demand that people refrain from offending is maintained if 
the State fulfills its duty to ensure that people’s basic needs are 
met.”89  Under this theory, there are three relevant guiding 
principles.  First, the state has a duty to provide, and the 
incarcerated individual the right to receive, rehabilitation.90  
Second, the amount of intervention by the criminal justice system 
in an incarcerated individual’s life should be entirely separate from 
rehabilitative goals; those sentenced to determinate or 
indeterminate sentences are equally entitled to rehabilitation.91  
Third, while the state is obligated to provide rehabilitation, 
engagement on the part of an incarcerated individual must be 
voluntary so that those participants derive authentic benefit from 
their choice to participate as opposed to developing resentment 
and decreased self-worth associated with mandatory, state-imposed 
programming.92  While mandatory participation might sometimes 
86.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1036. 
87.  Lewis, supra note 80, at 119. 
88.  Id. 
89. Peter Raynor, et al., Why Help Offenders? Arguments for 
Rehabilitation as a Penal Strategy, 1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PROBATION 3, 12 
(2009). 
90.  Lewis, supra note 80, at 124. 
91.  Id.  Consider the instant case of Gregory Diatchenko. 
92.  Id. 
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be necessary in the penal context, “moral agency,” or, in essence, 
dignity, must be protected wherever possible.93  These guiding 
principles, along with a humanist lens, will be used to analyze 
where Massachusetts can improve its current approach to 
rehabilitation of those it incarcerates. 
E. Rehabilitation in Massachusetts 
The prison system in this country was informed by the ideal of 
rehabilitation.94  As it was in the context of developing a juvenile 
justice system, Massachusetts was once a leader in rehabilitating 
those it incarcerated by preparing them for reentry.95  Furlough 
programs were popular in the 1980s and allowed incarcerated 
individuals to interview for jobs, search for housing, and reconnect 
with their families and communities before release.96  From a 
utilitarian lens, this reentry programming clearly lends itself to 
increased productive citizenry—those who previously did not 
contribute to society, or the economy, in positive ways are now 
operating in compliance with societal norms and contributing.  
However, furlough programs can also be viewed as humanistic in 
that they loosen the restraints on incarcerated individuals and allow 
spatial and temporal separateness from the criminal justice system 
in which individuals can rebuild their independence and idea of 
self.  Unfortunately, participation in these programs dwindled in 
the subsequent decades when the Commonwealth’s, and the 
country’s, focus shifted to the War on Drugs97 and those presently 
93.  Id. at 127. 
94. David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 105 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995).   
Following independence, Americans repudiated British approaches to 
criminal justice. Correctional reform based on rehabilitative ideals and 
prison reform became a central concern of the newly formed legislatures.  
However, those ideals quickly collapsed as prisons became overcrowded 
and pragmatic magistrates pursued conformity with the law above all else.  
Not until after the Civil War would rehabilitation recapture the nation’s 
attention.   
Id. at 102–05. 
95.  MASSINC, supra note 19, at 17. 
96.  Id. 
97.  In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a War on Drugs, naming drug 
abuse as “public enemy number one in the United States.”  Thirty Years of 
America’s Drug War, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ [https://perma.cc/DV9J-Y4FB] (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2016).  While funds were initially funneled into treatment during the 
Nixon administration, the next thirty years witnessed the majority of funding going 
towards enforcement of the new drug laws.  Id. 
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incarcerated were moved to the fiscal and media back burner.98 
In addition to furlough programs, more than one-quarter of 
those incarcerated individuals discharged in 1985 came out of pre-
release centers—lower-security detention facilities with a specific 
focus on rehabilitation.99  This number fell to just fourteen percent 
in 2011, as funding for pre-release centers and programs was 
beginning to be cut.100  Because the prevention of on-going criminal 
activity, namely drug-related offenses, was deemed to be of greater 
societal importance than the reform of those currently 
incarcerated, the number of those incarcerated in Massachusetts 
steadily rose101 as the funding of rehabilitative programs continued 
to drastically decrease.102  These statewide reductions went so far as 
to ultimately eliminate the education line item entirely from the 
Department of Correction’s (“DOC”) budget.103  Despite the 
research that shows education’s positive effect on recidivism, 
numbers of participation in post-secondary courses have also 
plummeted from over 2000 Massachusetts inmates in 1992 to only 
302 in 2010.104 
In order to illustrate that Massachusetts is capable of satisfying 
a legal obligation to provide dignity-centric rehabilitative services, 
consider three of the eighteen correctional facilities105 and their 
approaches to rehabilitation.106  By far, one of the most successful 
Liberal advocates and social commentators . . . have long maintained that 
the war on drugs has been a costly failure.  The litany of critiques is 
familiar: it does not stem the use of drugs, it disproportionately targets 
racial minorities, and it destroys the livelihoods of farmers around the 
world.  Yet only recently, in a climate of steep state budget deficits, have 
lawmakers called drug law enforcement into question in the name of saving 
scarce state resources. 
Heather Schoenfeld, The War on Drugs, the Politics of Crime, and Mass 
Incarceration in the United States, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 316 (2012) 
(internal citations omitted).  
98.  MASSINC, supra note 19, at 16. 
99.  Id. at 17. 
100.  Id. at 17. 
101. Prison Population Trends, MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., 10–11 (May 9, 
2014), http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/doc/research-reports/pop-trends/ 
prisonpoptrends-2013-final-5-21-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M6J-YT59].  
102.  MASSINC, supra note 19, at 18. 
103.  Id.  
104.  Id. at 17–18. Some of this decline may be due to federal policy changes 
regarding financial aid available to those incarcerated.  Id. at 18. 
105. See generally DOC Facilities, EXEC. OFFICE OF PUB. SAFETY & SEC., 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/prisons/doc-facilities/ 
[https://perma.cc/2XX8-25V7] (last visited Feb. 29, 2015).  
106. AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., LIFE AFTER LOCKUP: 
IMPROVING REENTRY FROM JAIL TO THE COMMUNITY 64–66 (2008), 
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facilities, in terms of a humanist approach, is located in Hampden 
County, Massachusetts.  The Re-Entry Continuum program was 
developed and overseen by Sheriff Michael Ashe for over thirty 
years.107  During this time, Re-Entry Continuum has grown its 
capacity to serve over 6,500 individuals annually (4,000 pre-trial 
and 2,600 sentenced inmates).108  The Hampden County Sheriff’s 
Department serves as our base for creating an amalgamated model 
of what rehabilitation could look like in Massachusetts.  Clearly, 
the theory of state-obligated rehabilitation hinges on there being a 
state-recognized right, which is here missing and being advocated 
for.109  However, the second principle, that the amount of state 
intervention be separate from rehabilitative goals, is here 
satisfied;110 Re-Entry Continuum provides rehabilitative services to 
all those who cross their threshold regardless of age, offense, 
sentence term, or even conviction.111  Additionally, 
comprehensive112 rehabilitative services are administered 
throughout an incarcerated individual’s sentence as opposed to 
limiting rehabilitation to brief transitional programming 
immediately before release or detaining a person deemed eligible 
for parole for longer to satisfy the reform requirement.113  The main 
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/life-after-lockup-improving-reentry-jail-
community/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/7VKL-EN33].  Discussion of three of 
the facilities follow, but the fourth, Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department’s 
Offender Re-entry Program, while successful, offers nothing unique for this 
analysis.  Id.  
107.  Hampden County Sheriff Michael Ashe celebrated at White House as 
‘Champion of Change,’ MASSLIVE (June 30, 2014), http://www.masslive.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2014/06/hampden_county_sheriff_michael_4.html []; see also The 
Brothers Keepers: In Hampden County, Mike and Jay Ashe make a House of 
Correction live up to its name, HAMPDEN CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T AND CORR. 
CTR., http://www.hcsdmass.org/brotherskeepers.htm [https://perma.cc/V98U-
ANXM] (last visited Feb. 29, 2015).  
108.  Solomon, supra note 106, at 133. 
109.  Lewis, supra note 80, at 119. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Solomon, supra note 106, at 133. 
112. Incarcerated individuals are expected to participate in forty hours of 
activity per week in programming areas such as: substance abuse education and 
treatment, educational development, criminal thinking, victim impact, a 
responsible parenting initiative geared toward fathers, and anger management.  Id. 
at 134.  Further, the department provides case management, health care, and 
counseling services to all those who enter the facility.  Id.   
113.  Id. at 132.  In addition to services throughout an individual’s sentence, 
those with ninety days or less remaining on their sentence begin meeting in the 
Correctional Center’s reentry resource room with an array of community service 
providers, including an education reintegration counselor, mentors, and case 
workers and some inmates spend the last thirty days of their sentence in the newly 
created community reentry unit.  Id. at 134. 
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drawback, and a difficult one to reconcile with the program’s 
effectiveness, is that sentenced inmates are required to participate 
in mandatory programming to encourage productivity.114  
Establishing a system with voluntary participation, thus honoring 
an incarcerated individual’s “moral agency,” is a guiding principle 
of rights-based rehabilitation.115 
Another especially effective feature of rehabilitative efforts in 
Massachusetts is found in the intake process of Re-Entry Matrix 
System at the Essex County Sheriff’s Department.116  Re-Entry 
Matrix System serves 1,500 of its 1,700 incarcerated individuals 
annually.117  At intake, inmates have an initial meeting that includes 
a comprehensive screening process that allows staff to become 
personally acquainted with each inmate.118  Clinical and program 
staff meet to determine placement of each individual in the facility 
and the suitability of certain programs and then develop a reentry 
plan.119  While participation is incentivized—eligibility for step-
down programs and “good time” credit—it is not mandatory as it is 
in Hampden County.120  Voluntary participation serves to recognize 
the moral agency and autonomy of those incarcerated and brings us 
closer to a workable model for rehabilitation once it is recognized 
as a state obligation.121 
Periodic review of reentry plans and communication with the 
incarcerated individual makes the Repeat Offender Public Safety 
Initiative of Norfolk County Sheriff’s Office another source from 
which to pull for our combined Massachusetts rehabilitation 
model.122  Serving approximately 100 of those 600 it incarcerates 
each year, Norfolk also creates a transition plan from the time an 
individual first enters the facility.123  Norfolk presents the plan to 
the inmates, so they understand why they are placed at a specific 
security level and how they can work to change their 
classification.124  Most notably, “an inmate undergoes classification 
review every 60 days to determine progress and whether any 
changes to the classification status or transition plan need to be 
114.  Id. at 133. 
115.  Lewis, supra note 80, at 119, 125. 
116.  Solomon, supra note 106, at 136. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. at 136–37. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 141. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
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made.”125  Such interactive, consistent meetings emphasize the 
program’s rehabilitative focus on agency and human dignity. 
Pulling together the key elements of the state-obligated 
rehabilitation model, or rights-based model, it is evident that 
Massachusetts can satisfy such a standard if it were to recognize a 
free-standing right to rehabilitation, as is argued for in Part IV.  
Hampden County has shown the effectiveness of providing a wide 
breadth of services to not only those sentenced in its facility but 
also those being detained pre-trial.126  Essex County adds to our 
best practice model by offering robust programming on a voluntary 
basis, thus recognizing the autonomy of those incarcerated in its 
facility and allowing such a free-willed choice to bolster self-
worth.127  Lastly, Norfolk County’s adaptive approach includes not 
only providing services at the time of entry, but also consistent 
evaluation of progress so as to best place individuals incarcerated 
in its facility to enable optimal growth.128  Again, these examples of 
best practices show that with a recognized right to rehabilitation, 
and the governance for compliance with a recognized right, that 
consistent rehabilitative services are possible for those incarcerated 
in Massachusetts state penal facilities. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF REHABILITATION AND PAROLING 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 
A. Empty Promises: Massachusetts Paroling Guidelines for Life 
Sentences 
In the absence of an actionable right to rehabilitation, there 
lies a perplexing juxtaposition between the expectations of the 
parole board and the reality for those trying to meet said 
expectations.129  Massachusetts paroling guidelines for those serving 
life sentences includes eight direct references to rehabilitated 
behavior or character; rehabilitation being the primary focus of two 
of the three main questions in the guidelines.130  Paroling numbers 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 132. 
127.  Id. at 136. 
128.  Id. at 141–42. 
129.  Massachusetts Guidelines for Life Sentence Decisions, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF PUB. SAFETY AND SEC., http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-
board/guidelines-for-life-sentence-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/MD4X-922R] 
(last viewed Feb. 29, 2016). 
130.  Id. 
I. Has the inmate’s period of incarceration been of sufficient length to 
adequately protect the public, punish him for his conduct, deter others, and 
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further support the inference that without the right to meaningfully 
access rehabilitative services, inmates are not satisfying the 
rehabilitation requirements for release.131 
In 1990, 69.9% of those eligible for parole in Massachusetts 
were released.132  The grant rate dropped to 40.5% in 2000 and by 
2013 was a mere 26%.133  When considering numbers that pertain 
to those serving life sentences, the numbers are yet lower.  In 2012, 
on initial hearing, that is after serving fifteen years of a life 
sentence, only 19% of those eligible were paroled and the numbers 
drop to 12% upon review after a designated period of time, set at 
five years but at the parole board’s discretion.134 
Lower paroling rates means that more individuals are released 
directly to the street.135  Of those incarcerated in Massachusetts 
state facilities, over 90% will be released during their lifetimes.136  
The cost of keeping those eligible for release incarcerated for 
longer terms detracts from funding for other services, such as 
rehabilitative programming.137  While at times opposed, utilitarian 
concerns here interplay with desired humanist outcomes and 
recognizing a free-standing right to rehabilitation would force 
officials to allocate funds to rehabilitation and, in turn, incentivize 
paroling. 
Parole board hearings are notoriously adversarial.  The 
achievements of prisoners are often minimalized, “[t]he tenor of 
the hearings discourages prisoners from continuing and/or 
embarking on a path of change and rehabilitation, as evidenced by 
the number of prisoners who choose to waive their hearings, rather 
than face the parole board.”138  A recognized right to rehabilitation 
allow for rehabilitation? . . . II. Is the inmate rehabilitated? . . . III. Are 
there reasons to conclude that the inmate will live outside prison as a 
sober, law-abiding, employed, productive person who is making positive 
contributions to his family and his community? 
Id. 
131. LESLIE WALKER, ET AL., PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVICES, WHITE 
PAPER: THE CURRENT STATE OF PAROLE IN MASSACHUSETTS 1, 3 (2013), 
http://www.cjpc.org/2013/White-Paper-Addendum-2.25.13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LRG2-FH5W]. 
132.  Id. at 1. 
133.  Id. at 1–2. 
134.  THE MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD, 2012 ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT 4 (2012), http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/ 
2452/208128/ocn711074206-2012.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
135.  MASSINC, supra note 19, at 16. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. at 2, 18. 
138.  WALKER ET AL., supra note 131, at 11. 
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would not only require availability and universality of 
programming, but also uniformity in evaluating those up for parole 
based on their compliance with or participation in available 
programming.  When there is uniformity with available 
rehabilitative services, and meaningful access to said services, 
paroling proceedings can become more predictable, encouraging 
inmate engagement. 
B. Recommendations Ignored 
In 2004, after the suicide of a high-profile inmate, Governor 
Mitt Romney ordered a commission to evaluate the Massachusetts 
DOC and compare their findings to national best practices.139  The 
Governor’s Commission on Corrections Reform found, among 
other concerns, that the DOC did not adequately prepare inmates 
for release back to the community and that models of effective 
reentry planning did in fact exist and could be effectively 
adopted.140  The Commission’s report included, inter alia, the 
following recommendations: shifting the rate of re-offense to a top 
priority, adopting a comprehensive reentry strategy, and 
establishing external review of inmate health and mental health 
services.141 
In 2013, the Massachusetts Institute for a New 
Commonwealth142 (“MassINC”) published updated findings on the 
139. GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONS REFORM, 
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
INSTITUTING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
(2004), http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/govcommission-corrections-reform. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/U43P-787U]. 
140.  Id. at vi–vii.  See generally Solomon, supra note 107 (proposing other 
models of reentry planning). 
141.  GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CORRECTION REFORM, supra note 139, 
at vii.  See also Patricia Garin, A Measure of the Bar: Prison Conditions in 
Massachusetts, 49 Oct. BOS. B.J. 19 (2005) (“[A]pproximately 25% of all prisoners 
are seriously mentally ill.  The vast majority of these prisoners receive[] little 
treatment.  When they are eventually released back into their communities, as 97% 
of all prisoners will be, they will likely be in much worse condition, become 
homeless, and fuel high recidivism rates.”). 
142.  MassINC is an independent, non-partisan think tank established to fill 
the gap in research on the issues facing the Commonwealth.  About Us, MASSINC, 
http://massinc.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/8NL9-9THH] (last visited Feb. 29, 
2016).  The report on the DOC was authored by a well-known coalition of experts, 
including prosecutors, corrections practitioners, defense lawyers, community 
organizers, and business people, who work towards reforming the criminal justice 
system in Massachusetts.  Criminal Justice Reform Initiative, MASSINC, 
http://www.massinc.org/Programs/Criminal-Justice.aspx [https://perma.cc/B86D-
SWLL] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).  
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status of Massachusetts corrections that illustrated a notable lack of 
progress on all the 2004 concerns and more.143  The report, while 
primarily concerned with the fiscal costs of incarceration, also 
addresses negative outcomes through analysis of recidivism.144  
Again, the findings call for an extensive survey of conditions of 
confinement, programming and program quality across the state, 
and the expansion and uniformity of reentry programming.145 
Waiting lists for rehabilitative services also continue to be an 
issue in Massachusetts, despite evidence that such programming 
reduces the rates of recidivism, and thus the costs of 
incarceration.146  At the time of the MassINC report, hundreds of 
incarcerated individuals were waiting for basic education programs 
and substance abuse programs, while thousands were waiting for 
behavioral therapy and violence reduction courses.147  The report 
calls for a moratorium on the construction of new penal facilities 
and a concerted effort to direct limited funds towards improving 
outcomes—albeit for economic efficiency—for those currently 
incarcerated.148 
C. The Failure of, and Mistake in Relying on, Federal Initiatives 
Decidedly utilitarian in nature, the federal statute popularly 
titled the Second Chance Act149 (“SCA”), signed into law by 
President George Bush in 2008 and reauthorized in 2013, was 
enacted to fund “services designed to reduce recidivism by 
improving outcomes for people returning from prisons, jails, and 
juvenile facilities.”150  However, the SCA falls short in its approach 
by waiting until reentry to address the negative effects of 
incarceration.  Under this approach, a seventeen-year-old like 
Gregory Diachenko or Philip Chism convicted of first degree 
143.  MASSINC, supra note 19, at 7. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. at 7, 31. 
147.  Id. at 18.  Program waitlist numbers at the time of publication were as 
follows: Adult Basic Education, 359; English as a Second Language, 304; GED, 
279; Pre-GED, 379; Substance Abuse, 813; Behavioral Therapy, 1102; Violence 
Reduction, 1592; Employment Readiness, 489.  Id. 
148.  Id. at 27. 
149. Second Chance Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism 
Prevention, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
150.  Second Chance Act, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE 
CENTER, http://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/second-chance-act/  
[https://perma.cc/9C9X-MUFG] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
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murder may need to wait until the age of thirty-seven,151 an age 
when character is unquestionably more fixed, before receiving vital 
social and emotional support or educational and vocational 
services.152  A rights-based approach to rehabilitation would 
allocate SCA dollars to neutralize the negative effects of 
incarceration beginning at the time of incarceration. 
“[F]ederal government spending on [SCA] programs amounts 
to less than $100 a year for each” released inmate.153  In the 
previous fiscal year, $68 million was awarded for the SCA, 
compared to the $115 million requested and the annual federal 
prison budget of $8.5 billion.154  This discrepancy illustrates why 
government programs, no matter how enlightened, are insufficient 
when not coupled with a recognized right to rehabilitation.155  
151. After the Diatchenko decision, An Act Relative to Juvenile Life 
Sentences for First Degree Murder was amended to prevent the paroling of 
juveniles after the standard fifteen years: 
In the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree 
committed by a person on or after the person’s fourteenth birthday and 
before the person’s eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term 
of not less than 20 years nor more than 30 years; provided, however, that in 
the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty committed by a person on or after the 
person’s fourteenth birthday and before the person’s eighteenth birthday, 
the court shall fix a minimum term of 30 years; and provided further, that 
in the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree 
with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought committed by a person 
on or after the person’s fourteenth birthday and before the person’s 
eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term of not less than 25 
years nor more than 30 years. 
2014 Mass. Acts ch. 189, § 6. 
152. Many facilities, unlike Hampden County, only make available 
rehabilitative programs to those with certain sentences shortly before their release.  
Solomon, supra note 106, at 64–66. 
153.  THE EDITORIAL BD., The Second Chance Act Proves Its Worth, N.Y. 
TIMES, (June 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/28/opinion/committed-
states-have-reduced-recidivism-rates.html?_r=0. 
154.  Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fiscal Year 2016 Request: State, Local 
and Tribal Law Enforcement Assistance, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/01/30/3_2016_state_and_local_chart.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9CW-F2A3]; with U.S. Dep’t of Justice Fiscal Year 2015 
Budget Request, State, Local and Tribal Assistance, 5, https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2013/08/29/state-local.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQR7-
8PPH]; and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, Prisons and 
Detention, 1, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2013/09/07/ 
prisons-detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7Q8-CSH2]. 
155.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1067 (“[R]ehabilitative action should not 
remain merely a goal of governmental policies, however enlightened and 
humanistic. Rehabilitation will be fully realized only when it is recognized as a 
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“[T]he description of rehabilitation as a right implies granting the 
rehabilitative claim a ‘certain threshold weight against collective 
goals in general.’”156 
The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction 
Act157 (“MIOTCRA”), initially enacted in 2004 with over $50 
million in funding, was also put on the budgetary back burner.158  
MIOTCRA is designed to fund mental health courts and diversion 
programs and generally to assist the states with “collaboration 
between criminal justice, juvenile justice, and mental health . . . 
systems.”159  A second explicit function of MIOTCRA is to fund 
programs that offer training to juvenile justice officers to identify 
symptoms of mental illness.160  While Congress reauthorized 
MIOTCRA in 2008 for an additional five years,161 President Barack 
Obama requested no funding for this program for fiscal year 2013 
and instead attempted to combine the funding with other drug and 
mental health programs.162  The condensed proposed bill, The 
Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Act of 2013, while under 
review since 2012 and endorsed by over 200 organizations 
nationwide, has been stalled for three years.163  The result in the 
right of the offender, independent of utilitarian considerations and of transient 
penal strategies.”).  
156.  Id. at 1027. 
157.  Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327. 
158.  Support Comprehensive Legislation that helps Counties Reduce the 
Number of Individuals with Mental Health Conditions in Jails, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, 
 http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016%20MIOTCRA3.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/J2D9-P6PX] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
159. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act, COUNCIL 
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/MIOTCRA_Fact_Sheet_2_21_12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24GL-S9MR] (last viewed Feb. 29, 2016). 
160.  Id. 
161. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Reauthorization 
and Improvement Act of 2008 Pub. L. No. 110-416, 122 Stat. 4352. 
162.  President’s Budget Proposes Continued Funding for Second Chance 
Act and Justice Reinvestment Initiative, JUSTICE CENTER (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://csgjusticecenter.org/jc/presidents-budget-proposes-continued-funding-for-
second-chance-act-and-justice-reinvestment-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/X9WJ-
FQYA].  The Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Act of 2013 passed the 
Senate Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support, and would reauthorize 
MIOTCRA.  Reauthorize the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, http://www.naco.org/ 
sites/default/files/dh%20%20--%20%20Mentally%20Ill.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Q6S-LRJA] (last visited on March 4, 2016). 
163.  Matt Goldenberg, Two Stalled Mental Health Bills Are Essential for 
All of Us, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-
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meantime is a de-emphasis on the specific rehabilitative and mental 
health needs of those incarcerated.  A state-obligated right to 
access of these types of rehabilitative services is needed—a right 
that cannot be undermined by budgetary constraints. 
The federal government cannot be relied on to provide 
consistent, adequate funding for rehabilitating those incarcerated 
in state facilities, and it should not be, as such a field is clearly 
within the state’s police powers.164  With the SCA, rehabilitation 
efforts begin too late, an especially problematic feature for those 
detained since youth.165  Realistically, as priorities shift, funding is 
redistributed and vital services needed during incarceration are put 
off until a later date.166  The Commonwealth itself does boast a 
number of educational and vocational opportunities for inmates, 
and a designated budget that has come to rely on largely state-
based funds.167  However, as it has been established at the federal 
level, without a right to these rehabilitative resources and 
meaningful access, such utilitarian opportunities are unreliable and 
do not enforce a dignity-centric model of reform. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF INCARCERATION 
A. Outcomes for Incarcerated Youth 
Philosopher Immanuel Kant warned of “punishments that 
dishonor humanity itself,” which would “make a spectator blush 
with shame at belonging to a species that can be treated that 
way.”168  To incarcerate someone as young as fourteen for an 
indeterminate amount of time without guaranteeing long-term 
rehabilitative services should cause the Commonwealth to redden. 
While it is difficult to control for confounding factors—such as 
the severity of the crime committed, issues pertaining to poverty, 
educational attainment and so forth—it has been found that those 
involved with the criminal justice system early in their lives are 
matt-goldenberg-do-/two-bills-prove-the-feder_b_6336796.html 
[https://perma.cc/PT4P-JSW8]. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution reserves for the states, or the people, those powers not expressly 
delegated to the federal government.  Id. 
165.  See supra Part II.C. 
166.  See Lewis, supra note 80, at 119. 
167.  Education and Training, OFFICE OF PUB. SAFETY AND SEC., 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/prisons/offender-progs/education-
and-training.html [https://perma.cc/M8R9-QHGU] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).  
168.  KANT, supra note 66, at 255. 
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more likely than their peers to struggle later in life.169  By 
deduction, a juvenile, eligible for parole after serving twenty 
years170 in prison, possibly all of which was served in an adult 
facility depending on pretrial detainment, is even more likely to 
struggle given the length of the sentence, time removed from the 
community during formative years, and the lack of age-appropriate 
services available in those facilities which predominately house 
adults. 
A principle reason for the holdings in Miller and Diatchenko, 
is that a child’s character is not yet fully formed,171 which is equally 
a reason why the Commonwealth has a duty to foster the juvenile 
offender’s development by way of guaranteeing rehabilitative 
services, even once juvenile offenders are moved to adult facilities.  
Studies have shown, that “[c]ompared [to] other kids with a similar 
history of bad behavior, those who entered the juvenile-justice 
system were nearly seven times more likely to be arrested for 
crimes as adults.”172  Given that this fact is in the context of the 
juvenile system and not the adult system, it stands to reason that 
the outcomes for those sentences as juveniles who develop in adult 
facilities are likely to have more dire outcomes.  Similarly, those 
youths sentenced to juvenile prison were “37 times more likely to 
be arrested again as adults, compared with similarly misbehaved 
kids who were either not caught or not put into the system.”173  
Even the tamely punitive intervention of community service, 
limiting exposure to other troubled kids, doubles a child’s 
likelihood of being arrested as an adult.174 
Educational programs have been shown to serve a utilitarian 
purpose—releasing a competent worker ready to contribute to the 
economy—but more importantly they also lend to the humanist 
goal of promoting self-worth.175  While education has been shown 
to significantly decrease rates of recidivism, its positive effect on 
169. Anna Aizer & Joseph Doyle, What is the long-term impact of 
incarcerating juveniles?, VOX (July 16, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-
long-term-impact-incarcerating-juveniles. 
170.  Depending on the severity of the crime, this could be twenty-five years. 
2014 Mass. Acts ch. 189, § 6. 
171. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 277 
(2013). 
172. Maria Szalavitz, Why Juvenile Detention Makes Teens Worse, TIME  
(Aug. 7, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1914837,00.html. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175. LAURA WINTERFIELD ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE EFFECTS OF 
POSTSECONDARY CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION, 13 (2009). 
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future outlook and attitudes towards incarceration make it not only 
the moral thing to do, but also a logical decision from the 
perspective of Commonwealth lawmakers.176 
The most common report across all stakeholder groups at all 
facilities was that involvement in [educational programming] 
affects inmate behavior and creates a safer prison 
environment . . . students recognized the privilege of being 
enrolled in these courses, and reported being careful to avoid 
situations that could result in disciplinary infractions and 
subsequently jeopardize their continued participation.177 
Turning out workers that can weld, plumb, or cook has its 
merits, but releasing individuals back into society who have 
developed a sense of belonging, pride, and self is likely to pay out 
in spades. 
Incarcerated individuals have higher rates of mental illness 
than the average population, and incarceration itself is known to 
exacerbate or even cause mental illness.178  Post Incarceration 
Syndrome (“PICS”) is defined as, “a set of symptoms that are 
present in many currently incarcerated and recently released 
prisoners that are caused by being subjected to prolonged 
incarceration in environments of punishment with few 
opportunities for education, job training, or rehabilitation.”179  
Treatment providers have noted a rise in the number of clients 
experiencing this combination of post-release symptoms.180  
Experts believe the rise in PICS is largely related to the reduction 
of access to education, vocational training, and rehabilitation 
programs.181  One such expert prescribes an “antidote” for PICS 
which includes, “converting 80% of our federal, state, and county 
correctional facilities into rehabilitation programs with daily 
involvement in educational, vocational, and rehabilitation 
programs” and “[i]nstitut[ing] universal prerelease programs for all 
offenders with the goal of preparing them to transition into 
community based addiction and mental health programs.”182 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. at 12. 
178. Terrence Gorski, Post Incarceration Syndrome and Relapse, THE 
ADDICTION WEBSITE OF TERRENCE T. GORSKI, http://www.tgorski.com/ 
criminal_justice/cjs_pics_&_relapse.htm [https://perma.cc/EWJ2-XKFU] (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
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Education, job training, and life skills are viewed as beneficial 
to those incarcerated183 adults who presumably had some 
opportunities for such engagement prior to incarceration.  The case 
for granting such opportunities as a right to juveniles is that much 
stronger since those incarcerated in their youth are required to 
start from the ground up when looking towards reentry.  Mental 
health concerns also step to the foreground when one considers the 
reality that an incarcerated juvenile will be forming his attitude, 
character, self-worth, and entire identity through the lens of 
incarceration.184  The Commonwealth’s only option to give these 
juveniles a chance at returning to society for a real “second chance” 
is to prioritize rehabilitation at the conception of incarceration and 
the neutralizing efforts cannot end when a juvenile is sentenced as 
an adult or transferred to an adult facility. 
IV. RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO REHABILITATION 
There are a multitude of sources from which Massachusetts 
courts and legislators could find a freestanding right to 
rehabilitation.  This assertion has as its foundation the basic 
premise that the SJC has “the inherent authority ‘to interpret 
[S]tate constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to 
individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States 
Constitution.’”185  The court has done this in holding that even 
discretionary life sentences without the possibility of parole unto 
juveniles violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.186  As explored in Part I.E of this Note, successful 
183. In re Gregory Diatchenko, W38579, (Mass. Parole Bd. Oct. 31, 2014); 
In re Joseph Donovan, W55313, (Mass. Parole Bd. Aug. 7, 2014); In re Anthony 
Rolon, W62684, (Mass. Parole Bd. Aug. 6, 2014); In re Frederick Christian, 
W64758, (Mass. Parole Bd. June 5, 2014); In re Thappi Phomphakdy, W69124, 
(Mass. Parole Bd. Dec. 11, 2013); In re Jason Clements, W64045, (Mass Parole Bd. 
Dec. 10, 2013); In re Michael Diaz, W66797, (Mass. Parole Bd. Dec. 3, 2013); In re 
Daniel Mendoza, W62695, (Mass. Parole Bd. Aug. 12, 2013); In re Saddiq Palmer, 
W62664, (Mass. Parole Bd. Aug. 12, 2013). 
184.  WINTERFIELD, supra note 175, at 13; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 520 (1972) (“Lengthy exposure to [confinement] has a destructive effect on 
human character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much 
more difficult.” (internal citation omitted)). 
185.  Libertarian Ass’n of Mass. v. Sec’y of the Commw., 969 N.E.2d 1095, 
1111 (Mass. 2012) (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
959 (Mass. 2003)).  See also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008) 
(quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)) (“[T]he State . . . may grant its 
citizens broader protection than the Federal Constitution requires by enacting 
appropriate legislation or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution . . . .”). 
186. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 275–76 
(2013); see also supra note 10. 
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programs in Massachusetts are practicable.187  Rather, what is 
lacking is the recognition that rehabilitation is a right owed to those 
incarcerated based on their inherent human dignity.188  While 
arguments for a free-standing right to rehabilitation have 
previously failed,189 this Note suggests that since then our standards 
of decency have in fact evolved to allow for reconsideration of the 
right to rehabilitation.  Those offenders taken from the community 
in their youth can serve as a starting point to progressively realize 
this right in this Commonwealth. 
The Massachusetts Legislature requires that the Commissioner 
of Corrections, 
[E]stablish, maintain and administer programs of rehabilitation, 
including but not limited to education, training and 
employment, of persons committed to the custody of the 
department, designed as far as practicable to prepare and assist 
each such person to assume the responsibilities and exercise the 
rights of a citizen of the commonwealth.190 
The language “as far as practicable” is deferential to a degree 
that renders the administration of meaningful rehabilitative 
programming anything but certain.  An argument for its 
enforcement comes by way of analysis of the article twenty-six 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment191 and article 
one’s equal protection guarantee.192 
A. The Lack of a Right to Rehabilitation as a Violation of the 
187.  See generally supra Part I.E. 
188.  Cepulonis v. Maloney, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 683, 684 (Super. Ct. 2003).   
It is well settled law that a prison inmate does not have a constitutional 
right to an educational, vocational or rehabilitation program.  Wishon v. 
Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 
740, 742 (5th Cir. 1990); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485-86 (7th Cir. 
1982).  However, a right to an entitlement in a program may be created by 
statute.  Here, the Legislature has instructed the Commissioner to 
‘establish, maintain and administer programs of rehabilitation including . . . 
education, training and employment of persons committed to the custody 
of the Department [of Correction].’  The language of the statute mandating 
that the Commissioner establish such programming creates more than a 
‘mere hope or expectancy’ of an educational program; it creates an actual 
entitlement in the program. 
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS. c. 124 § 1(e) and Ass’n for Reduction of Violence 
v. Hall, 558 F.Sup. 661, 663–64 (D.Mass. 1983). 
189.  Ladetto v. Comm’r of Corr., 385 N.E.2d 273, 274 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
190.  MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 124 § 1(e). 
191.  MASS. CONST. art. XXVI. 
192.  MASS. CONST. art. I. 
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Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment changes as 
society’s notions of decency evolve, “the words of the [Eighth] 
Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static.”193  
The analogous state provision to the Eighth Amendment, article 
twenty-six of the Massachusetts Constitution, equally is shaped by 
constituents and officials in Massachusetts and their notions of 
decency.194 
After the prisoners’ rights movement of the 1960s, 
incarcerated individuals were transformed from slaves of the state 
into legal persons.195  The previous deference given by courts to 
administrators, known as the “hands off” doctrine, was gradually 
abandoned as courts began to mandate norms and minimum 
standards for penal institutions.196  Deprivation of rights seen as 
nontrivial continued to be allowed, as required for incarceration, 
but arbitrary deprivations or additional punishment other than 
incarceration itself began to be viewed as excessively punitive and a 
violation of the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.197 
The seminal case of Holt v. Sarver198 created a standard for 
courts around the country when it held, “[t]he absence of an 
affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may have 
constitutional significance where in the absence of such a program 
conditions and practices exist which actually militate against reform 
and rehabilitation.”199  The test for constitutional prison conditions 
evolved into a totality of conditions test.200  This test views 
rehabilitative programs as a component of confinement so that if, 
in their absence, confinement becomes cruel and unusual, a 
negative indirect right to rehabilitative programs must be found.201  
Incarceration alone degenerates, even when conditions are 
otherwise “fair.”202  Rehabilitation by way of participation in 
educational or vocational programs, such as those funded by the 
SCA or even those inconsistently offered by various state facilities, 
193.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958). 
194.  MASS. CONST. art. XXVI. 
195. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 
1960–80, 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 429, 434 (1980). 
196.  Id. at 435–36. 
197.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1039. 
198. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 
(8th Cir. 1971). 
199.  Id. at 379. 
200.  Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
201.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1043. 
202.  Id. at 1049. 
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is thus insufficient in a system where degradation is a daily 
experience. 
The idea of rehabilitation continues to play a central role in 
the court’s analysis of the conditions of confinement.203  A well-
known, persuasive New Hampshire case204 illustrates the extent to 
which a court may go in regulating unconstitutional prison 
conditions: 
Where the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration 
threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-
being of the inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism 
and future incarceration, a federal court must conclude that 
imprisonment under such conditions does violence to our 
societal notions of the intrinsic worth and dignity of human 
beings and, therefore, contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.205 
Based on the totality of conditions analysis, courts have held 
that a prisoner has a constitutional right to rehabilitation programs 
in certain situations where the absence of programming would 
allow for inhumane confinement.206  A humanist framework allows 
one to consider how being stripped from the natural right, the 
moral right, to dignity, could be considered inhumane. 
B. Right to Rehabilitation based on Equal Protection Grounds 
A right to rehabilitation based on equal protection is rooted in 
the idea that an incarcerated individual retains “all basic rights not 
incompatible with incarceration.”207  One groundbreaking case that 
opened the door to equal protection claims for those incarcerated 
is Morales v. Schmidt.208  In Morales, the court held that “the equal 
protection clause applies not only within the group of persons 
203.  Id. at 1039. 
204. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977) (issuing 
seventy-five separate orders to correct prison conditions such as: offering 
vocational training in marketable skills, effective religious and educational 
programs, therapy, and individual counseling). 
205.  Id. 
206. Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 208–09 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.Supp. 956, 981 (D.R.I. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 
437 F.Supp. 269, 316 (D.N.H. 1977); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.Supp. 873, 898 
(W.D.Mo. 1977), aff’d in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); James 
v. Wallace, 382 F.Supp. 1177, 1181–82 (M.D.Ala. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 
362, 378–79 (E.D.Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).  
207. Rotman, supra note 73, 1055 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
547–48 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
208.  Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972). 
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convicted of a crime, but also to governmental treatment that 
distinguishes this group from the general population.”209  Here the 
court reasoned that the difference between categories, between 
those convicted of a crime and those not, “should not escape the 
judicial scrutiny borne by other governmental classifications for the 
purpose of differential treatment.”210  The court decided that if the 
distinction between the two groups is one that is a fundamental 
interest, then “the burden will be upon the government to show a 
compelling state interest in the differential treatment.”211  While 
courts have not held that the right to rehabilitation is a 
fundamental one for incarcerated adults,212 the argument ought to 
be different in the case of an incarcerated individual ripped from 
the community as a juvenile and being sentenced as an adult, given 
the science and social science recognized by the courts in the thirty 
years since Morales. 
There are two points of comparison when considering an equal 
protection argument that the lack of rehabilitation services is 
constitutionally impermissible:  first in regard to the general non-
incarcerated population, and second in relation to those 
incarcerated in other state penal facilities.213  The general 
population may experience treatment, self-improvement, or 
rehabilitation by way of seeking out counseling or treatment 
groups, by accessing religious communities, and more.214  By 
removing an incarcerated individual’s ability to seek out these 
types of treatment or restorative services for himself, the penal 
system arguably becomes responsible for ensuring the availability 
of such services.215  Denying these services can then be viewed as 
overly punitive; individuals are “not sent to a penal institution to 
receive additional punishment . . . . The fact of incarceration itself 
is the punishment.”216 
Further, a certain level of public education is also a right 
available to juveniles in the general incarcerated population, but 
not necessarily those incarcerated as adults.217  This point is 
209.  Rotman, supra note 73, 1054. 
210.  Morales, 340 F. Supp. at 550. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Ladetto v. Comm’r of Corr., 385 N.E.2d 273, 274 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
213.  See Rotman, supra note 73, at 1026. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Barnes v. Virgin Is., 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (D.V.I. 1976). 
217. MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 5, § 2.  The SJC has interpreted the 
Education Clause as placing an enforceable duty on the Commonwealth to provide 
public education for its children regardless of personal or communal fiscal 
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especially relevant in the instance of juveniles who may have been 
removed from the education system as early as fourteen and were 
then sentenced as adults after long pre-trial periods.  This missed 
educational experience is an impermissible result of their 
confinement.  “[D]epriving prisoners of rehabilitation . . . would 
deny them equal protection if an almost identical right to 
rehabilitation applies to similarly situated non-prisoners.”218  Or in 
other words, 
If punishment is to conform to its overt legal objectives, the 
state must guarantee the equal protection of inmates’ basic 
rights.  Meaningful rehabilitative programs must be developed 
to counteract the degrading and socially detrimental situation of 
incarcerated prisoners.  This legal obligation of the state should 
correspond to the rights of inmates to education, vocational 
instruction and maintenance of acquired skills, mental health 
and remunerated work in the same way they belong to other 
citizens.219 
The second facet of the equal protection argument pertains to 
those services afforded inconsistently to other incarcerated youth 
in the Commonwealth’s facilities.  Juveniles who are tried for less 
egregious crimes are processed via the juvenile justice system, as 
opposed to the criminal justice system, which again bears a 
maximum penalty of incarceration until twenty-one years of age.220  
Juveniles that enter into the juvenile justice system receive 
treatment until they are twenty-one whereas those who commit 
more egregious crimes, arguably an increased reason for 
rehabilitation, are denied that benefit when tried and sentenced as 
adults.  And even further, different facilities offer different ranges 
and depths of programming, creating a situation where some 
individuals have substantial access to rehabilitative services while 
others are indefinitely wait-listed.  The varying discrepancies in 
access and treatment could constitute impermissible discrimination 
under the Commonwealth’s equal protection clause should 
capability.  McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 621 
(Mass. 1993).  In order to accomplish this constitutional duty, the Massachusetts 
Legislature has enacted a compulsory education statute.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 76, § 1 (1994). 
218. Rotman, supra note 73, at 1054 (quoting Peter Dwyer & Michael 
Botein, The Right to Rehabilitation for Prisoners—Judicial Reform of the 
Correctional Process, 20 N.Y.L.F. 273, 284 (1974)). 
219.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1057. 
220.  In September of 2013, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed 
into law a bill expanding the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to seventeen-year-olds.  
St. 2013 c. 84.  
2016] THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 255
Massachusetts endeavor to provide a free-standing right to 
rehabilitation. 
C. International Law Expectations of Rehabilitation and Juvenile 
Protections 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts should look to the 
numerous international laws, treaties, and norms to find a right to 
rehabilitation for those it incarcerates, especially in the context of 
juvenile offenders tried and sentenced as adults.  Looking 
internationally to fill in gaps or bolster domestic law has becoming 
increasingly acceptable.  Justice Kennedy famously opined in 
Roper, “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our 
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of 
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.”221 
Similarly, the decision in Miller included consideration of 
international customary law.222  Customary international law is one 
of the sources of international law and refers to international 
obligations arising from established state practice, as opposed to 
those created by formal treaties.223   In other words, customary 
international law results from a general and consistent practice of 
states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation.224 
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (“SMR”), while not legally binding, sets 
forth, 
The purpose and justification of a sentence of imprisonment or 
a similar measure deprivative of liberty is ultimately to protect 
society against crime. This end can only be achieved if the 
period of imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, that 
upon his return to society the offender is not only willing but 
221.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
222.  Brief for Amnesty Int’l et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
22, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647); G.A. Res. 
44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, at 37 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter 
“Convention on the Rights of the Child”] (stating explicit ban on sentencing 
children to life in prison without the possibility of parole). 
223.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, art. 38(1)(b), http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2. 
[https://perma.cc/UD44-6PWW]; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 
(5th ed. 2003). 
224.  SHAW, supra note 223, at 80. 
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able to lead a law-abiding and self-supporting life.225 
In Connecticut, the court used the SMR, which is actually 
adopted in the preamble to the Administrative Directives to the 
Connecticut Department of Corrections, as a basis for declaring 
overcrowded conditions in its state prisons unconstitutional.226 
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), passed in 1966, but not ratified until 
1976, entreats, “[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment 
of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation 
and social rehabilitation.”227  Similarly, the American Convention 
of Human Rights (“ACHR”) article 5, section 6 implores, 
“[p]unishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an 
essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the 
prisoners.”228 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) was used 
in both the Miller and Diatchenko decisions for its explicit ban on 
sentencing children to life without the possibility of parole.229  
Section one of the same convention implores taking a child’s age 
into account when considering not only the punishment, as 
Massachusetts has done, but also the measure of rehabilitation.230  
Similar language is found in several other international documents 
that implore taking into account the child’s age not only for 
sentencing but also rehabilitation and the desirability of promoting 
the child’s reintegration into society.231 
Lastly, multiple international sources also support the notion 
that lack of rehabilitation is a form of cruel, unusual, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.232  ICCPR prohibits physical and non-
225.  UN Doc. A/CONF/611, annex 1, ESC Res. 663C, (XXIV) (1957), UN 
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 11, UN Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by ESC Res. 2076, 
(LXII) (1977), UN ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, UN Doc. E/5988 (1977). 
226.  Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187–89 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980). 
227.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 
38 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter “Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”]. 
228.  Am. Convention of Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-
32), art. 5(6), Nov. 22, 1969, Stat. 17955, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36. 
229.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 222, at art. 37. 
230.  Id. 
231. Am. Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 7, 1948, 
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 
17; Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 227, at ¶ 38; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 222, at art. 40(1). 
232.  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 227, at ¶ 27; 
G.A. Res. 39/46, (XVII), Convention Against Torture (Dec. 10, 1984); Am. 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 231, at art. 36. 
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physical harm and abusive forms of detention and requires that age 
be taken into account in determining what constitutes cruel, 
inhumane, infamous, and unusual punishment.233  Again, a lack of 
contemporaneous rehabilitation may not have previously been 
recognized as cruel and unusual punishment in the context of adult 
offenders,234 but in the context of a juvenile detained for egregious 
crimes in adult facilities since youth, such a practice bends towards 
the indecent.235 
D. Non-Legal Sources Supporting the Right to Rehabilitation 
In Massachusetts, as well as many other states, a right to 
rehabilitation can be inferred from the purpose of the correctional 
system and its general directives as how to treat those they 
incarcerate.236  The Massachusetts DOC reports its vision moving 
forward as, “provid[ing] safe, secure and humane custody while 
preparing inmates to return to society in a way that makes it less 
likely that they will re-offend.”237  Similarly, the juvenile justice 
system itself implies the desire for and goal of rehabilitation. Since 
the creation of the Juvenile Court in 1906, the Commonwealth has 
recognized that children differ from adults in their legal capacity 
and culpability and require different treatment.238 
The American Bar Association’s recommendations for the 
treatment of prisoners also illustrates the desire for a dignity-
centric approach to incarceration and thus rehabilitation.  Standard 
23-7.1, Respect for Prisoners, endorses, “[c]orrectional authorities 
should treat prisoners in a manner that respects their human 
dignity, and should not subject them to harassment, bullying, or 
disparaging language or treatment . . . .”239  Standard 23-8.2(a), 
233. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 227, at ¶ 27; 
Convention Against Torture, supra note 232, at art. 16; Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, supra note 231, at art. 36. 
234. Ladetto v. Comm’r of Corr., 385 N.E.2d 273, 274–75 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1979). 
235.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (What punishment is barred by 
the Eighth Amendment must be determined based “from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”); see also Dist. Att’y for the 
Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 124, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (holding that article 
XXVI of state constitution equally non-static and thus capital punishment is 
impermissibly cruel in Massachusetts given contemporary standards of decency). 
236.  Rotman, supra note 73, at 1065 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 24, § l (e)–
(f)). 
237.  GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONS REFORM, supra note 
139, at 4.  
238.  MONAHON & KABAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
239.  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 201 (3rd ed. 2011). 
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Rehabilitative programs, furthers: 
For the duration of each prisoner’s confinement, the prisoner—
including a prisoner in long-term segregated housing or 
incarcerated for a term of life imprisonment—should be 
engaged in constructive activities that provide opportunities to 
develop social and technical skills, prevent idleness and mental 
deterioration, and prepare the prisoner for eventual release. 
Correctional authorities should begin to plan for each prisoner’s 
eventual release and reintegration into the community from the 
time of that prisoner’s admission into the correctional system 
and facility.240 
The Boston Bar Association has also echoed this standard.241 
CONCLUSION 
“If rehabilitation is the goal for teenagers who are tried and 
sentenced as adults, then prison is not the answer.”242  Or, at least, 
not prison as we know it.  The Commonwealth must treat those it 
incarcerates as the holders of rights, including the right to 
rehabilitation, not so that the Commonwealth may reap a benefit 
from employable post-release skills, but so that those released may 
reenter society as a whole person, able and willing to participate in 
a dignified society.243 
Massachusetts should, as many states have,244 incorporate the 
goal of rehabilitation into the state constitution and further expand 
constitutional protections by recognizing that goal as a state 
obligation.  We need to move away from what a state should 
refrain from doing, and towards what a state should affirmatively 
240.  Id. at 246. 
241.  See Edward P. Leibensperger, Constructive Return of Inmates is 
Integral to Public Safety, 49 NOV./DEC. BOS. B.J. 2 (2005); Patricia Garin, A 
Measure of the Bar: Prison Conditions in Massachusetts, 49 SEPT./OCT. BOS. B.J. 
18 (2005). 




243. Cf. Coffin v. Reichard, 148 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1945) (holding that 
prisoners retain all civil rights except those expressly taken by law or those whose 
removal is necessary to the attainment of legitimate penal goals), cert. denied, 325 
U.S. 887 (1945). 
244.  See N.H. CONST. art. XVIII (“The true design of all punishments being 
to reform, not to exterminate mankind.”); OR. CONST. art I, § 15 (Punishment 
must be based on “principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.”); WYO. 
CONST. art. I, § 15 (“The penal code shall be framed on human principles of 
reformation and prevention.”). 
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do for its incarcerated citizens.  The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts can and should recognize an actionable right to 
rehabilitation for those incarcerated in its state penal facilities 
beginning with those removed from society in their youth. 
